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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of homegrown Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks
is on the increase in the United States. 1 Since the attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001 there have been sixty
incidents of terrorism in this country, including the intentional
driving of a vehicle into a crowd of students at the University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill in 2006; the shooting at a Little Rock,
Arkansas army recruitment office in 2009; the shooting at Fort
Hood in 2009; and the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing 2
which killed four people and injured 264, 3 and was the fifty-ninth
publicly known terror plot against the United States since 9/11. 4
Forty-nine of these plots originated in the United States and
involved American citizens, or legal permanent residents
* Attorney, Washington D.C. The author previously served as an Attorney
with the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Las Vegas and Pittsburgh,
the Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, and the Office of the
Colorado State Public Defender. LL.M., The George Washington Law School;
J.D., St. Mary’s School of Law; B.A., Sonoma State University.
1 JESSICA Z UKERMAN, ET. AL., THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 60 TERRORIST
PLOTS SINCE 9/11: CONTINUED LESSONS IN DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM 1
(2013), available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/SR137.pdf.
2 Id. at 2.
3 Scott Malone & Richard Valdmanis, Boston Bomber Apologizes, Admits
Guilt for Deadly 2013 Attack, REUTERS (June 24, 2015),
www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/24/us-boston-bombings-trialidUSKBN0P417520150624.
4 Z UKERMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
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radicalized in the United States. 5 Military facilities, mass
gatherings, nightclubs and bars, and shopping malls were the
primary targets. 6 In addition, according to a Congressional
Committee report authored by the Homeland Security Committee,
more than 250 Americans have traveled overseas since 2011 to
join terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), and some plan on returning to the United States to commit
terror attack plots. 7
What happens if there is a series of large-scale terrorist
incidents, close in time, in the United States? 8 Amidst the
Id. at 2.
Id.
7 Alicia Caldwell, Congress: U.S. Fails to stop most people trying to join
ISIS, AP (Sept. 29, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1d66f48b7d614ae187
cff5a2aa517bf5/report-us-failing-stop-most-people-trying-join-isis;
HOMELAND
SECURITY COMMITTEE , TERROR THREAT SNAPSHOT: ISIS ATTACK PLOTS
AGAINST
WESTERN
TARGETS
(2015),
available
at
https://
homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/HHSC-October-TerrorThreat-Snapshot1.pdf.
8 In such a situation when there are so many terrorist attacks in a short
period of time, and a trial is held in the same city where in the events took
places, there could be potential deprivation of the right to be tried by a fair
and impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
guarantee a capital defendant the right to a fair trial before a panel of
impartial and indifferent jurors. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992);
see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (“The constitutional
standard of fairness requires that a defendant have ‘a panel of impartial,
indifferent’ jurors.’”) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). This
guarantee means “a jury that determin[ed] guilt on the basis of the judge’s
instructions and the evidence introduced at trial, as distinct from
preconceptions of other extraneous sources of decision.” Oswald v. Bertrand,
374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004). Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees may be violated if a prosecutor engages in an effort to create in the
courtroom an atmosphere of fear of imminent threat of serious bodily injury or
death, to the jurors and the community at large in and around the city, from
Terrorist outsiders. Potentially, if the jury makes its decision based on fear,
Petitioner may be entitled to a new trial under the principles of Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91
(1923). Empirical evidence exists showing that fear about dangerous criminals
roaming around on the streets is a prominent factor influencing jury decisions
to impose capital sentences. Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in
Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty 1 O HIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 585, 595
(2004) (“juries are fearful that even if they impose a sentence of life without
parole, the defendant will be released and perhaps cause more harm.”); Peter
A. Barta, Between Death and a Hard Place: Hopkins v. Reeves and the “Stark
Choice” Between Capital Conviction and Outright Acquittal, 37 AM . CRIM . L.
REV . 1429, 1467 (2000) (“Well before they are selected to serve, potential
jurors are inundated with widespread media accounts of never-ending appeals
and dangerous murderers paroled only to kill again.”); Robert E. Knowlton,
Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1119
(1953) (“If the jurors impose capital punishment because of the fear that the
defendant may be paroled at some future time, they are, in effect, predicting
5
6
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immediate shock, anger, fear, and outcry, will the President choose
to coral individuals or groups under suspicion based on the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”), 9 which
provides the authority to do so. 10
These concerns about U.S. citizens being held indefinitely,
without being provided any due process because the U.S.
government deems them to be associated with terrorists, are real.
It would not be the first time in U.S. history that the government
held U.S. citizens indefinitely. The internment of 120,000
Japanese Americans pursuant to Executive Order 9066 during
World War II would serve as the dubious precedent. 11 The
internment is considered one of the twentieth century's most
prominent mass trampling of civil liberties and it has been widely
condemned as racist governmental and judicial conduct toward the
Japanese and Japanese Americans. 12
In 2011, at a Justice Department event honoring Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders, then Acting Solicitor General
Neal Katyal remarked that one of his predecessors, Charles Fahy,
an appointee of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, concealed from
the United States Supreme Court a military report showing that
Japanese Americans posed no threat during World War II—
undermining the Government’s justification for the internment of
over 120,000 Japanese Americans in “relocation camps” during

that when the question of his parole arises several years hence, he will be
unworthy of it but will be paroled nonetheless.”). This fear about criminals
and the crimes they commit is facilitated by the media. See Bandes, supra note
8, at 592.
9 P.L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2001).
10 See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu:
“Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 MO. L. REV . 1, 1 (2011)
(posing the question of whether Korematsu v. United States –the United
States Supreme Court case that upheld internment of Japanese-American
citizens during World War II– will be extended to the war on terrorism after
another terrorist attack in the U.S.).
11 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
12 See, e.g., ERIC Y. Y AMAMOTO ET AL., RACE , RIGHTS AND REPARATION:
LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT xxiii (2001); NOAH FELDMAN,
SCORPIONS: BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S G REAT SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 237 (2010) (“The government of the United States could not have
interned the Japanese-Americans were it not for the tradition of anti-Asian
prejudice in the country in general and on the West Coast in particular.
Although historically the bias was predominantly anti-Chinese, there was no
hesitation in deploying stereotypes of the shifty, untrustworthy Oriental onto
both first-and second-generation Americans of Japanese origin.”); Jerry Kang,
Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV . 933,
1004 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he Judiciary aided and abetted the
internment of Japanese Americans in disturbingly clever ways. It did so not
only in terms of substance, by agreeing with a racial profiling justification
based on faint evidence, but also in terms of procedure-by delaying, framing,
segmenting, and not deciding what was centrally at issue”).
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World War II. 13 Katyal’s formal statement follows longstanding
denunciations by scholars and jurists about the Court’s
internment case rulings which paid great deference to the
Government’s claims of military necessity, and upheld the
detention of Japanese Americans. 14 Even though the internment
cases were ruled almost seventy years ago, the issue of the
indefinite detention of American remains relevant today during
the “war on terrorism.” 15
In Hedges v. Obama, 16 writers, journalists, and activists
sought a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of a
provision of the NDDA. District Judge Katherine Forrest held that
the NDAA provision was facially overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment and impermissibly vague in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 17 However, the government appealed, and the Second
Circuit ultimately held that the NDAA affirmed the President’s
authority under the Authorization of Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”) 18 reasoning that since the NDAA did not apply to
citizens, lawful aliens, or individuals captured or arrested in the
United States, the plaintiffs lacked standing. 19
This essay outlines the problems posed by the NDAA and
interprets the Act’s language to answer the question of: whether
American citizens can be indefinitely detained under the NDAA?
13 David G. Savage, U.S. Official Cites Misconduct in Japanese American
TIMES,
(May
24,
2011),
Internment
Cases,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/24/nation/la-na-japanese-americans20110525; ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE : A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 122
(1997) (“A generation later, the injustice of the evacuation is clear. There was
no evidence of either sabotage or even cooperation with the Japanese military
by either Issei or Nisei at Pearl Harbor. Underscoring the irrationality of the
evacuation was the anomaly that the Japanese residents in Hawaii were not
evacuated, and the fact that German and Italian aliens, who might move more
freely about, were never considered for mass evacuation.”).
14 See generally Y AMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 12, at xxiii; see also Beverly
E. Bashor, The Liberty/Safety Paradigm: The United States’ Struggle to
Discourage Violations of Civil Liberties in Times of War, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV .
617, 618 (2014) (characterizing the Japanese American internment as “one of
the largest violations of civil liberties in the nation’s history”) (quoting Bill
Ong Hing, Lessons to Remember From Japanese Internment, HUFFINGTON
POST (Fed. 21, 2012) www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/lessons-toremember-from-_b_1285303.html.).
15 See ERIC K. Y AMAMOTO, ET AL., RACE , RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW
AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 391 (2d. ed. 2013) (hereinafter
YAMAMOTO 2013) (offering the Japanese American internment as a framework
for racial profiling in the wake of 9/11 and asserting that “[t]he unprecedented
expansion of executive power stands as a dominant theme of the war on
terror.”).
16 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
17 Id. at 470-71.
18 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001).
19 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1936 (2014).
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It is divided into four sections. Part One analyzes the U.S.
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Korematsu v. United States 20 and
the three other internment cases. Part Two details the origins of
the NDDA. Part Three analyzes the district ruling and the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Hedges. Part Four discusses how another
Korematsu could be avoided, and draws parallels between the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II and the
war on terrorism after September 11th.

II. THE JAPANESE AMERICAN I NTERNMENT
By all reasonable social measures other than their skin color,
each Japanese and Japanese American internee was just like
other Americans. But nevertheless, to the government and the
courts, they were presumptively disloyal. 21 Internment was an
egregious example of how laws may be used as an instrument of
racism, and how racist laws may be defended by claims that they
are not based on race. 22 Even before Pearl Harbor, Japanese
immigrants and their American-born children endured great
hardship in this country because they were perceived by whites as
economic threats. Due to these perceived threats, Japanese
immigrants were subjected to official discrimination and political
protest. 23 This anti-Japanese ferment resulted in the formation of
the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. 24 Fueled by fear and
hostility, “the League sought to exclude the Japanese through the
use of legislation, boycotts, school segregation, and propaganda.” 25
The bombing of Pearl Harbor allowed for the creation and
maintenance of concentration camps for all individuals of
Japanese descent, including American citizens who held no
allegiance to Japan or its culture, but were rather fully
assimilated into the mainstream American culture. 26 In the eyes of
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See YAMAMOTO, supra note 12, at 104-20 (discussing Gordon
Hirabayashi's upbringing in Washington state, his participation in civic
activities, and the Supreme Court's writing in Hirabayashi v. United States
that Japanese Americans are presumptively disloyal).
22 Id. at 104.
23 COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS ,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 32 (1982).
24 See Lawrence Kent Mendehall, Note, Misters Korematsu and Steffan:
The Japanese Internment and the Military’s Ban on gays in the Armed Forces,
70 N.YU. L. Rev. 196, 200 (1995).
25 Id.
26 E.g., Y AMAMOTO, supra note 12, at 104-20. Presumably, there would
have been more naturalized Americans of Japanese descent if it were not for
the Naturalization Act of 1906 which allowed only “free white persons” and
"persons of African nativity or persons of African descent" to naturalize and
become U.S. Citizens. A person was a citizen if he or she was white and not
foreign. The important right to become a citizen was dependent on non20
21
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the U.S. government, Japanese and Japanese Americans were all
foreigners. 27
A reexamination of the internment cases provide for a fuller
understanding of the contemporary debate about the NDAA
because the Act, as detailed in Part Two, could be construed by a
court as among “the existing law or authorities” supporting an
executive decision to indefinitely detain an American citizen. First,
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 28 Gordon Hirabayashi was
convicted for violating Public Proclamation No. 3, 29 which imposed
a curfew on all enemy aliens and citizens of Japanese descent. 30
Hirabayashi was born and raised in Seattle, Washington, and had
never been to Japan. 31 He had no personal contacts in Japan. 32
Like all Japanese Americans, Hirabayashi was subject to General
DeWitt's curfew order, requiring him to be at home each night
from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. 33
Hirabayashi was convicted of two separate counts of
intentionally violating the evacuation order and the curfew
order. 34 The Supreme Court avoided the difficult issues of
evacuation and internment, and instead simply upheld
Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the curfew. 35 Chief Justice
Stone wrote the majority opinion, which reflected the established
social mood and political climate of the time. He explained that at
the time of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, approximately
two-thirds of those of Japanese descent on the West Coast were
United States citizens. 36 It was only racism and discrimination, he
insisted, that “prevented their assimilation as an integral part of
the white population.” 37 But when weighed against national
security, Stone reasoned that there was a reasonable basis for the
curfew: “[w]e cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by
foreignness and whiteness. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 192-93
(1922) (describing how the Naturalization Act of 1906 operated).
27 See Harvey Gee, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience: A
Review Essay, 13 G EO. IMMIG. L.J. 635, 641 (1999) (stating with regard to the
Japanese American internment “[h]istory has shown that the legal system has
played a central role in the racialization of Asian Americans as outsiders.”);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of Foreignness in
the Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN AM . L.J. 71, 76
(1997) (“The racialized identification of Japanese Americans as foreignregardless of their citizenship-allowed for otherwise unlawful actions to be
taken against United States citizens.”).
28 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
29 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942).
30 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88.
31 Id. at 84.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 83-84.
34 Y AMAMOTO, supra note 12, at 105.
35 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105.
36 Id. at 96.
37 Id.

2015]

National Insecurity

75

experience, that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations
with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than
those of a different ancestry.” 38 Justice William Douglas, in his
concurrence, noted that the curfew order, as opposed to an
individualized process of investigations and hearings, was the
most practical measure at the time. 39 Even Justice Frank Murphy,
a well-known civil libertarian jurist, concurred with the majority
opinion. 40 Though he condemned racism, he nevertheless
concluded that after the Pearl Harbor attack, military necessity
required a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of U.S.
citizens. 41
In Yasui v. United States 42 Minoru Yasui was a U.S. citizen,
educated as a lawyer, employed in a Japanese consular office, and
actively involved in the Japanese Americans Citizens League. 43 He
and his family were ordered to leave their home and report for
internment. 44 Decided the same day as Hirabayashi, Yasui's
conviction was sustained for the same reasons. 45
In Korematsu v. United States 46 the Court restricted its
holding to the question of the evacuation alone, again avoiding the
issue of the internment's constitutionality. 47 Justice Black wrote
for five members of the Court, while Justice Frankfurter wrote a
concurring opinion, and Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson
dissented. Fred Korematsu's lawyers wanted to characterize the
internment as about race, since from the outset, Japanese
Americans were excluded from the West Coast under threat of
force, detained, and then immediately interned. 48 Though
Korematsu argued that when Exclusion Order No. 34 49 was
promulgated in May of 1942, all danger of Japanese invasion of
the West Coast no longer existed, the Court was persuaded by the
government's claims of military necessity and reasoned that
although Exclusion Order No. 34 may have been both over-and
under-inclusive, it was the practical measure at the time. 50 The
Court based its decision upon General DeWitt's unsubstantiated
finding that Japanese Americans posed a real danger of espionage
Id. at 101.
Id. at 106-07 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 109-14 (Murphy, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 112-13.
42 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
43 Y AMAMOTO, supra note 12, at 126-27.
44 Id.
45 Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117.
46 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47 Y AMAMOTO, supra note 12, at 155.
48 See Harvey Gee, Civil Liberties, National Security, and the Japanese
American Internment, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV . 771, 783 (2005) (book review).
49 Exclusion Order No. 34 was substantially based upon Exclusion Order
9066.
50 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
38
39

76

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:69

on the West Coast. 51 Accordingly, the Court upheld the Exclusion
Order. 52
According to Justice Black, the constitutionality of Civilian
Restrictive Order No. 1, 53 which came into effect eleven days
before Korematsu's arrest, and provided the authority to detain
individuals of Japanese ancestry, was never considered by the
Court largely because it was not necessary to do so. 54 Justice Black
closed his opinion by reiterating that Japanese and Japanese
Americans were not imprisoned solely because of their race. 55
In his powerful dissent, Justice Jackson emphasized that
Korematsu was a U.S. citizen who lived in the United States his
entire life, there was no evidence of disloyalty on his part, and he
would not have been subject to the military order if he were
German or Italian. 56 Jackson noted that courts are limited in
examining the necessity of military orders, and will trust
government claims of military necessity. 57 He warned that once a
judicial opinion finds a military order conforms to the Constitution
or that the Constitution sanctions the order, “the court for all time
has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens.” 58 According to
Jackson, this would be like having “a loaded weapon” ready for
use. 59
In Ex Parte Endo 60 the Justices unanimously ruled that the
U.S. government could not continue to detain a citizen who was
"concededly loyal" to the United States. 61 The case arose from
Mitsui Endo's habeas corpus petition filing. 62 Mitsui Endo, an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was initially removed to
the Tule Lake War Relocation Center, in California, and later
transferred to the Central Utah Relocation Center. 63 Treating the
case as an administrative matter, the Court found that Endo was
never served with process, nor did she appear in the proceedings. 64
Endo alleged that she was a loyal and law abiding American
citizen, and as such was being held unlawfully and against her
will, because no formal charges were brought against her. 65
Id. at 227-29 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 219 (Black, J., majority).
53 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (Jan. 21, 1943).
54 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220-23.
55 Id. at 223.
56 Id. at 242-43 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 244.
58 Id. at 246.
59 Id.
60 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
61 Id. at 297.
62 Id. at 285.
63 Id. at 284-85.
64 Id. at 285.
65 Id. at 294.
51
52
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Since World War II, the internment cases have been relegated
to passing reference. For instance, Korematsu has served as the
obligatory citation for the origin of the Supreme Court's strict
scrutiny standard of review. 66 Importantly, Korematsu only
discussed the constitutionality of the exclusion order, 67 and
avoided the issue of the constitutionality of the internment—
“whether it is constitutional to order the mass incarceration of
persons as to whom no individual showing of guilt has been made,
ostensibly because of national security, though also with the use of
racial classifications.” 68
Modern scholars suggest that Korematsu has limited
application, and serves more or less as historical precedent
standing for the proposition that during a time of war, or amidst
claims of military necessity, the courts must protect constitutional
guarantees. 69 Justice Stephen Breyer offers this explanation in his
book, Making Our Democracy Work: 70
History did not bear out Justice Jackson’s prediction that the
decision would create a bad legal precedent, a precedent that would
lie in wait “like a loaded weapon” waiting to justify a future abusive
act. The decision has been so thoroughly discredited that it is hard
to conceive of any future Court referring to it or favorably relying on
it. 71

But these assurances that Korematsu has limited application
can be disputed because the case was never directly overruled. As
such, the ruling arguably remains a loaded weapon for a President
and the U.S. government to use. Indeed, it can be a powerful tool
for the government to use in its prosecutions against terrorists. 72
66 See Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The
Supreme Court Moves From Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to
Disapproving Affirmative Action for African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE &
LAW 165, 165-66 (1996).
67 See Kang, supra note 12, at 949-52.
68 Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of
the Japanese American Internment, 17 CRIM . JUST. 52, 55 (2002).
69 Id.; see also Beverly E. Bashor, The Liberty/Safety Paradigm: The
United States’ Struggle to Discourage Violations of Civil Liberties in Times of
War, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV . 617, 627 (2014) (characterizing the Japanese
American internment as one of the largest violations of civil liberties in the
nation’s history).
70 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING O UR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE ’S VIEW
(2010).
71 Id. at 193.
72 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV . L. REV . 379, 400 (2011)
(“Korematsu should be a valuable precedent for the government in its
prosecutions of the war on terror, given its outsized deference to executive
power.”); Marilyn Hall Patel, et al., Justice Restored: The Legacy of Korematsu
II and the Future of Civil Litigation, 16 ASIAN AM . L.J. 215, 215 (2009)
(discussing the political use of Korematsu as legal precedent); Jerry Kang,
Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s Shadow, 68
Law & Contemporary Probs. 255, 275 (2005) (“Korematsu acts as ‘anti-
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Professor David Harris argues that Korematsu has continuing
relevance and vitality as governing law, 73 and observes, “many
jurists and scholars believe that no court today would ever rely on
Korematsu to sustain something as outrageous as another
internment. Looked at closely, however, the law does not support
this view. Korematsu remains a ‘loaded weapon,’ just as Justice
Robert Jackson predicted in his dissent.” 74 Similarly, Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that the Guantanamo Bay cases
repeat the mistake of Korematsu on a smaller scale, since
detainees are held indefinitely without meaningful due process,
and that Korematsu is a reminder of the role of race in judicial
decisions. 75 But as troubling as these theories may be, the next
section explains how Korematsu can be considered as being an
“existing authority,” along with other Court rulings, as defined in
the NDAA. 76
precedent’ in its application of the legal rule to the facts. The application failed
not only because the Court was fed bad data, as demonstrated by the coram
nobis cases, but also because the Court [was] influenced by . . . the racial
common sense of the times.”); Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and
the Elusive Goal of Principled Decision making, 1991 WIS . L. REV . 837, 843-44
(1991) (explaining “the courts generally have rejected the idea that
Korematsu, decided during war, may be minimalized as precedent during
peace . . . [Thus] Korematsu continues to exert its adverse influence.”); Nathan
Goetting, A Perfect Peace Too Horrible to Contemplate: Justice Holmes and the
Perpetual Conviction of Eugene Victor Debs, 63 G UILD PRAC. 135, 136 (2006)
(arguing that Korematsu has precedential value because it remains to be good
law); Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag, The Continued Relevance of the
Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 307, 332
n.138 (2006) (explaining because of limited judicial criticism “Korematsu is
technically ‘good law.’”); Wu, supra note 68, at 52 (“The internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II is the obvious precedent for the
treatment of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in the aftermath of the
September 13, 2001.”). But see Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases:
Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV . 957, 960 (2010)
(arguing that Korematsu has limited application as legal or live precedent);
Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104
W. VA. L. REV . 571, 586 (2002) (arguing that considering “[e]ight of the nine
currently sitting Justices on the Court have either written or concurred in
opinions describing Korematsu as error . . . it seems safe to say that the
majority opinion in Korematsu would not command a single vote today, let
alone a majority.”).
73 Harris, supra note 10, at 8-12.
74 Id. at 3.
75 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy
Hopefully Never to be Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV . 163, 170-71 (2011); see also
YAMAMOTO 2013, supra note 15, at 390 (“President [Bush] aimed to prevent
these detainees from airing their claims of innocence in U.S. courts by
characterizing them as the ‘worst of the worst.’ After years of harsh
incarceration, the Administration quietly acknowledged that many of these
detainees—some of whom the military and CIA tortured—were not dangerous
and released them.”).
76 See Alfred C. Yen, Praising With Faint Damnation:
The Troubling
Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV . 1, 2 (1998) (“The Supreme Court
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III. THE NDAA AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
A. 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force
A week after terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and Pentagon killed nearly three thousand people, Congress
passed the 2001 AUMF, 77 authorizing the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
intentional terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons. 78

The resolution was aimed at a new kind of enemy that did not
represent a government, and one that targeted civilians. 79
In the week following September 11th al Qaeda terrorist
attacks in the United States, Congress passed the USA Patriot
Act, 80 which expanded the federal government to authorize
warrantless searches and seizures, interception of electronic
communications, including wiretaps, 81 and the grounds upon
which noncitizens could be removed from the country. 82
Emboldened with this authority, the U.S. government
implemented special registration of Arab and Muslim noncitizens,
indefinitely held “enemy combatants” and engaged in the selective
deportation
campaigns
based
on the national origin. 83
Consequently, Arab and Muslim noncitizens were removed from
the United States in large numbers. 84 Professor Chemerinsky
has never overruled the case. It stands as valid precedent, an authoritative
interpretation of our Constitution and the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’”).
77 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
78 Id.
79 Sarah Lohmann & Chad Austin, When the War Doesn’t End, Detainees
in Legal Limbo, 92 DENV . U. L. REV . O NLINE 1, 7 (2014).
80 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
81 ANGELA J. DAVIS , ARBITRARY JUSTICE : THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 115 (2007).
82 K EVIN R. JOHNSON, O PENING THE FLOODGATES : WHY AMERICA NEEDS
TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 99 (2007).
83 Id. at 57; see also Neil Gotanda, Reflections on Korematsu, Brown and
White Innocence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV . REV . L. REV . 663, 663 (2004) (“[T]here
was widespread use of ethnic profiling aimed at individuals who ‘look Arab’
immediately after 9-11. Such profiling is based upon a presumption that
someone who ‘looks Arab’ is potentially disloyal.”).
84 JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 57; see also Harris, supra note 10, at 29
(“Since most of the men incarcerated in the aftermath of the attacks were
immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia, the government
accomplished the round up through a systematic use of immigration law. Not
a single one of the detainees faced terrorism-related criminal charges, and the
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relays, “[h]undreds of individuals who have never had any
meaningful factual hearing or any due process remain in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Bush Administration claimed the
ability to detain even American citizens without process or
showing to any court individualized suspicion or probable cause.” 85
While President Barack Obama’s made a promise to close
Guantanamo Bay when he was stumping on the campaign trail in
2008, more than half of the remaining 164 Guantanamo Bay
detainees, most of whom were picked up mistakenly in the chaotic
days after 9/11, are eligible for transfer to foreign countries, but
remain in custody due to legal complications. 86

B. National Defense Authorization Act of 2012
In 2012, as part of the NDAA, Congress attempted, for the
first time, to codify a substantive detention standard. The 2012
NDAA, still in effect, affirms an expansive reading of the 2001
AUMF’s detention authority. 87 Within the 566-page Act lies the
detention clause of Section 1021 affirming the authority of the
armed forces of the United States to detain a covered person
pursuant to the AUMF. A covered person under this section is:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported such hostiles in aid of such enemy forces. 88

The NDAA also “requires” that non-U.S. citizens be treated as
enemy combatants rather than criminal suspects unless the
President issues a waiver in the interests of national security.
However, the NDAA does not “require” that U.S. citizens be
treated in a like manner. Instead Section 1021(e) provides the
following vaguely worded protections to Americans: “Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the existing law or
authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens,
Federal Bureau of Investigation only filed criminal charges in a few cases.”).
85 Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 171.
86 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Q&A: Transferring Cleared Guantanamo
Detainees to Foreign Countries Under the SASC FY 2014 NDAA,
www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/QA-foreign-transfer-provisions-forguantanamo-detainees-in-SASC-NDAA.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
87 Oona Hathaway, et al., The Power to Detain Detention of Terrorism
Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 125 (2013) (asserting that “the
2012 NDAA significantly expands the possible scope of law-of-war detention.”).
88 Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2012).
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lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons
who captured or arrested in the United States.” 89
A number of Senators raised concerns that Section 1021
provided new authority to the President to detain Americans
citizens indefinitely, with an emphasis on citizens captured
domestically in the Congressional floor debates. 90 But there were
divergent opinions. On the one hand, Senator Lindsey Graham (RS.C.), a major NDAA supporter, argued:
The enemy is all over the world. Here at home. And when people
take up arms against the United States and [are] captured within
the United States why should we not be able to use our military and
intelligence community to question that person as to what they
know about enemy activity. They should not be read their Miranda
Rights. They should not be given a lawyer. They should be held
humanely in military custody and interrogated about why they
joined al Qaeda and what they were going to do to all of us. 91

On the other hand, Senator Rand Paul (R-K.Y.) urged, “I’m
very, very, concerned about having U.S. citizens sent to
Guantanamo Bay for indefinite detention.” 92 Echoing these
sentiments were Democrats who compared the military policing of
Americans to the Japanese American internment. 93
While the NDAA contains a clear provision explicitly
confirming that the AUMF includes the authority to hold
individuals as part the indefinite military detention without trial,
because of its use of ambiguous terms, certainly it leaves open
questions as to who does the AUMF apply to, and how long does it
last. 94 These provisions were referred to as “serious reservations”
by President Obama when he signed the NDAA into law on
December 31, 2011. After explaining that he signed the Act
primarily because it authorized national defense funding and
necessary services for service members and their families,
President Obama professed that that he will not exercise the
authority to detain U.S. citizens under the NDAA:
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d at 185.
Id. at 184.
91 Michael McAuliff & Jennifer Bendery, Senate Votes to Let Military
Detain Americans Indefinitely, White House Threatens Veto, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 29, 2011), www.huffingstonpost.com/2011/11/29senate-votes-toleft-military-detain-americans-in defintiely_n_1119473.htm l.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear
Statement Rule and the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United
States, 101 G EO. L.J. 1399, 1401-1402 (2013) (asserting that “existing law or
authorities” is both ambiguous and troubling); Colby P. Horowitz, Creating a
More Meaningful Detention Statute: Lessons Learned from Hedges v. Obama,
81 FORDHAM L. REV . 2853, 2855 (2013) (criticizing Section 1021 of the NDAA
for failing to define and limit the executive’s detention authority).
89
90
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I want to clarify that my Administration will not authorize the
indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens . . .
My administration will interpret section 1021 in a manner that
ensures that any detention it authorizes complies with the
Constitution, the laws of war, and all other applicable law . . . under
no circumstances will my Administration accept or adhere to a rigid
across-the-board requirement for military detention. 95

Almost immediately, public interest groups voiced their
criticisms despite Obama’s assurances. Anthony D. Romero,
American Civil Liberties Union Executive Director, asserted, “[t]he
statute is particularly dangerous because it has no temporal or
geographic limitations, and can be used by this and future
presidents to militarily detain people captured far from any
battlefield.” 96 The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL)
recalling the experiences of the internment during World War II,
added that the NDAA may render the Non-Detention Act of 1971,
which was passed to prevent another internment of Japanese
Americans in the United States, meaningless. 97
Besides Korematsu, there is extant law that can be used to
support or oppose the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens. Ex parte
Quirin 98 serves as precedent for the government to argue that the
United States Supreme Court has approved the indefinite
detention of an American citizen on U.S. soil. In addition to
Korematsu and Quirin, another source of existing law or
authorities is Zadvydas v. Davis, 99 wherein the Court recognized
that the individual challenging his detention may not be held by
the Executive without due process. 100 The Court held that habeas
corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “remain available as a
forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removalperiod detention,” and indefinite detention of a removable alien
after a removal proceeding violates a due process right. 101 The
Court concluded that the presumptive period during which an
alien's detention is reasonably necessary to effectuate removal is
six months, and that he must be conditionally released after that

95 THE WHITE HOUSE O FFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Statement by the
President on H.R. 1540, Dec. 31, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540.
96 See American Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Signs Indefinite
Detention Bill Into Law (Dec. 31, 2011), www.aclu.org/news/president-obamasigns-indefinite-detention-bill-law.
97 Id.
98 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (allowing for the indefinite military detention and
evacuation of an American citizens detained in the U.S.).
99 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
100 Id. at 690.
101 Id. at 688-90.
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time, if he can demonstrate that there is “no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 102
Against this backdrop, the scope of the AUMF as applied to
U.S. citizens, or to noncitizens arrested within the territorial
United States, remains unclear today, and controversially so. 103 As
the list of individuals and groups who are terrorists plotting
against the U.S. continues to expand from the individuals and
groups associated with the 9/11 attacks, Professor Stephen
Vladeck argues, “[t]he case for preserving the AUMF in its current
form has little to do with continuing uses of force against al Qaeda
and the Taliban, and everything to do with uses of force against
other groups . . . and with preserving detention authority for the
current Guantanamo detainees.” 104

C. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Establishing the Legal
Authority for the NDAA
Sixty years later after Korematsu, the Court affirmed the
President’s power to indefinitely detain members of al Qaeda and
the Taliban in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 105 Yasser Esam Hamdi, an
American citizen, maintained that he had been mislabeled as a
Taliban fighter, and was denied due process. Hamdi was born in
102 Id. at 701. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), the Court
extended its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) to inadmissible aliens. The
Court concluded that there was no reason why the period of time reasonably
necessary to effect removal would be longer for an inadmissible alien,
therefore the six-month presumptive detention period prescribed in Zadvydas
should be applicable to inadmissible aliens. Id. at 386.
103 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Detention After the AUMF, 82 FORDHAM L. REV .
2189, 2193-94 (2014) (explaining AUMF’s inherent ambiguities).
104 Id. at 2191.
105 542 U.S. 507 (2004). See also Harris, supra note 10, at 28 (explaining
that “Hamdi actually allows the executive to hold American citizens
indefinitely, without charges or trial, as enemy combatants.”). During the
2003-2004 Supreme Court term, the Court issued rulings in two other
detention cases. In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), the narrow issue
was whether the habeas statute conferred a right to judicial review of the
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercised
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 442. The Court, in order to avoid
rampant forum shopping, held strictly to the “general rule that for core habeas
petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only
one district: the district of confinement.” Id. at 443. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) the Court addressed whether the six-hundred detainees at the
American naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, could challenge the legality
of their detention in U.S. courts on the basis that none were enemy
combatants or terrorists. Id. at 471. Petitioners claimed: (1) no charges were
filed against them; (2) they were not provided counsel; and (3) they were
denied access to the court. Id. at 472. In a six-to-three decision, the Court held
that United States courts have federal jurisdiction to consider challenges to
the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection
with hostilities. Id. at 485.
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Louisiana in 1980. 106 As a child, he and his family moved to Saudi
Arabia. 107 He resided in Afghanistan when he was seized by the
Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military. 108 After an
initial interrogation, Hamdi was removed from Afghanistan to the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. 109
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, holding
that Hamdi must be afforded due process and given judicial notice
and a fair and meaningful opportunity to contest his detention. 110
The Court emphasized the importance of providing to prisoners
basic constitutional due process, 111 and allowed Hamdi to contest
the government's basis for his designation as an enemy
combatant. 112 The Court explicitly rejected the administration's
position that enemy combatants are not entitled to traditional
legal rights. 113 After the Court's decision, the Justice Department
agreed to release Hamdi after more than two years of detention
during which time no charges were filed and lawyers were
withheld. 114 Hamdi was released and returned to Saudi Arabia on
the conditions that he give up his U.S. citizenship, renounce
terrorism, and agree not to sue the U.S. government. 115
The Court’s discussion of the AUMF is especially noteworthy
because it was the first and last time the high court addressed the
substantive scope of executive detention under the statute. As an
initial matter, Justice O’Connor stated “the AUMF is explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals”
because it is an Act of Congress authorizing “the President to use
‘all
necessary
and
appropriate
force’
against
‘nations,
organizations, or persons’ associated with the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.” 116 O’Connor was not concerned that the AUMF
does not contain the specific word “detention” “[b]ecause detention
to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 533.
111 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
112 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
113 Id. at 532-33.See also JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN O RIGINAL: THE LIFE
AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 337 (2009)
(explaining that “the [Hamdi] decision struck the core of the Bush
administration system for holding foreign terrorism suspects and, more
generally, the president’s authority in war-related matters and international
obligations.”).
114 See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Will Free Louisiana-Born “Enemy
Combatant,” L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A25.
115 Abigail Lauer, Note, The Easy Way Out: The Yaser Hamdi Release
Agreement and the United States’ Treatment of the Citizen Enemy Combatant
Dilemma, 91 CORNELL L. REV . 927, 936-40 (2006).
116 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-18.
106
107
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incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and
appropriate force,’ Congress clearly . . . authorized detention in the
narrow circumstances here.” 117 Thus, Justice O’Connor reasoned
that because United States troops are engaged in active combat in
Afghanistan, detentions of citizen-detainees are part of the
exercise of “necessary and appropriate force” authorized by the
AUMF. 118
In his concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter
disagreed with the plurality’s acceptance of the Government’s
position Hamdi’s detention was authorized by the AUMF. 119
Souter specifically argued that Hamdi was entitled for released
under the Non-Detention Act of 1971, which states, “No citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 120 Apparently, the
Japanese internment was prominent on Justice Souter’s mind
because he devoted several passages to discussing the Japanese
American internment case precedents and made several key
points. According to Souter, when “Congress repealed the
[emergency Detention Act of 1950] and adopted §4001(a) for the
purpose of avoiding another Korematsu, it intended to preclude
reliance on vague congressional authority . . . for detention or
imprisonment at the discretion of the Executive . . . .” 121 Thus,
“Congress necessarily meant to require a congressional enactment
that clearly authorized detention or imprisonment.” 122
A decade after Hamdi, the robust litigation over the detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay continues in tandem with vigorous
disagreements between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches concerning the law on detention.

IV. HEDGES V. OBAMA
The plaintiffs in Hedges v. Obama were a broad coalition of
private citizens, lawyers, and legislators opposing §1021.
Christopher Hedges, foreign correspondent and Pulitzer Prize
winning journalist, had traveled to the Middle East, the Balkans,
Africa, and Latin America, had interviewed detained al Qaeda
members, and reported on groups regarded as terrorist
organizations. 123 Alexa O’Brien, was the founder of U.S. of Day of
Rage, wrote articles published articles on WikiLeaks’s release of
U.S. State Department cables and about Guantanamo Bay
Id. 519.
Id. at 521.
119 Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 541-42 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
121 Id. at 543-44.
122 Id. at 544.
123 890 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
117
118
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detainees. 124 Kai Wargalla, an organizer and activist based in
London, was the Deputy Director of the “Revolution Truth” an
organization facilitating international speech activities though
website forums. 125 Finally, the Honorable Brigitta Jonsdottir, a
member of parliament in Iceland, and activist and WikiLeaks
spokesperson, received a subpoena for content from her Twitter
account. 126
After hearing testimony and weighing evidence, District
Court Judge Forrest issued a preliminary injunction which blocked
the indefinite detention powers of the NDAA on ground of
unconstitutionality. 127 The court held that plaintiffs had standing
to bring their facial challenge; the NDAA provision was facially
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and impermissibly
vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 128
For the most part, Judge Forrest subjected the AUMF and
§1021(b)(2) to heightened review because they implicated
fundamental liberties. 129 In rejecting the Government’s position
that the AUMF and §1021(b)(2) are coextensive, and determining
that that the Government failed to show why §1021 (b)(2) should
not be permanently enjoined, Forrest made several distinct points
to support her conclusion. First, Forrest traced the AUMF and
case law discussing the President’s detention authority under the
AUMF to demonstrate that AUMF set forth detention authority
tied directly and only to September 11, 2001. 130 She then found
that the executive branch began to interpret its detention
authority more broadly, but without additional Congressional
authorization. 131 Forrest insisted that §1021 is not specifically tied
to 9/11, unlike the AUMF. 132 Forrest noted that §1021(b)(2) “adds
a new element not previously set forth in the AUMF . . . section
1021 explicitly incorporates disposition under the law of war.” 133
Second, “[t]he expansion of detention authority to include
persons unconnected to the events of September 11, 2001,
unconnected to any battlefield or to the carrying of arms, is, for the
first time codified in §1021.” 134 Judge Forrest observed that even
though the new statute states ‘reaffirmation’ it appears as if broad
detention authority was always authorized, “[i]t had not.” 135 To the
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
126 Id. at 437.
127 Id. at 470-71
128 Id.
129 See Y AMAMOTO 2013, supra note 15, at 419.
130 Hedges, 890 F. Supp. 2d. at 440-45.
131 Id. at 444-45.
132 Id. at 439.
133 Id. at 441.
134 Id. at 444.
135 Id. at 429.
124
125
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contrary, she perceived Section 1021 as an ex post facto legislative
‘fix’ “to provide the President (in 2012) with broader detention
authority than was provided in the [2001] AUMF.” 136
As for the First Amendment claims, Forrest declared that the
discussion of the two statutes’ differences support factual findings
that each plaintiff has a reasonable fear that §1021(b)(2) presents
a new scope for military detentions. 137 Significantly, Judge Forrest
cited Supreme Court precedent that illustrates the exception to
the injury-in-fact requirement for standing when First
Amendment rights, and are infringed. 138 Under this standard, the
court found that the facts support each plaintiff’s standing to bring
a pre-enforcement, facial challenge with respect to §1021(b)(2). 139
“Each plaintiff has engaged in activities in which he or she is
associating with, writing about, or speaking about or to al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or other organizations and groups, which have
committed terrorists against the United States” and therefore fall
under the umbrella of §1021(b)(2). 140 In her view, the “plaintiffs
need not wait until they have been detained and imprisoned to
bring a challenge—the penalty is too severe to have to wait.” 141
Accordingly, Judge Forrest reasoned that an actual case or
controversy remains because the plaintiffs were aware about the
threat of indefinite military detention under §1021. 142
The court further concluded that there was a Fifth
Amendment and Due Process violation because §1021(b)(2) did not
provide fair notice of conduct that was forbidden or required. 143
Plaintiffs testified that they do not understand the terms
“substantially supported,” “directly supported,” or “associated
forces.” 144 Accordingly, Judge Forrest determined that the
respective meanings of the terms at issue are unknown, the scope
of §1021(b)(2) is therefore, impermissibly vague under the Fifth
Amendment. 145
Finally, the importance of the case did not escape the court’s
attention and its relationship to the Japanese American
internment. Since Judge Forrest stressed the present case
presented an important constitutional question and acknowledged
“[c]ourts must safeguard core constitutional issues.” 146 She cited to
Korematsu and mentioned that the Supreme Court’s due deference
Id.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
136
137
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at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

444-45.
448.
452.
452-53
453.
429.
466-67.
467.
470-71.
430.
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to the executive and legislative branches during World War II is
now generally condemned. 147
The plaintiffs’ victory was short-lived. The Second Circuit
reversed the district court and held that (1) §1021(b)(2) affirms the
general AUMF authority; 148 (2) Section 1021(b)(2) is Congress’
express resolution of an earlier debated question about AUMF’s
scopes; which does not limit or expand the detention authority; 149
and (3) the text indicates that “captured or arrested in the United
States” is meant to modify only “any other persons.” 150
The Second Circuit paid particular attention to the floor
debates in the Senate, specifically Senator Dianne Feinstein’s
unsuccessful attempts to amend §1031 to indicate that the
statute’s authority would not allow for the detention of U.S.
citizen. 151 Eventually, Senator Feinstein was able to have her
compromise amendment incorporated into the final form of
§1021(e) which states: “Nothing in this section shall be constructed
to affect existing or authorities relating to the detention of United
States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any
persons who are captures or arrested in the United States.” 152
The thrust of the opinion lies in the panel’s analysis of the
§1021’s language and legislative history. Here, unfortunately, the
court’s interpretation reinforces, rather than explains, the
ambiguous nature of the statute’s terms.
[I]n stating that Section 1021 is not intended to limit or expand the
scope of the detention authority, under the AUMF, Section 1021(d)
mostly made a statement about the original AUMF. . . it states only
a limitation about how Section 1021 may be construed to affect that
existing authority, whatever that existing authority may be. . . .
Section 1021 (e) provides that Section 1021 just does not speak—one
way of the other—to the government’s authority to detain citizens,
lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in
the United States. 153

Next, departing from Justice Souter’s reasoning in his
concurrence in Hamdi, the court determined that no clear
statement by Congress was necessary for “the detention of
American citizens apprehended on American soil under the NonDetention Act” because from its vantage point, §1021(e) is clear,
and confined by legislative history. 154
The court further stressed:
Id. at 431.
Hedges, 724 F.3d at 190-91.
149 Id. at 191.
150 Id. at 192.
151 Id. at 184-85.
152 Id. at 185.
153 Id. at 191-92.
154 Id. at 193 n.137.
147
148
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While it is true that Section 1021 (e) does not foreclose the
possibility that previously ‘existing law’ may permit the detention of
American citizens in some circumstances . . . [t]here is nothing in
Section 1021 that makes any assumptions about the government’s
authority to detain citizens under the AUMF. Rather, Section 1021
(e) quite specifically makes clear that the section should not be
construed to affect in any way existing law or authorities relating to
citizen detention, whatever those authorities may provide. 155

On the issue of standing, the panel briefly stated that §1021
makes no assumptions about the government’s authority to detain
citizens under the AUMF because the language of the section
states that it does not affect existing law or authorities. 156 The
panel contended that the authorities allow for, but do not require
detention, and as such, §1021 only affirms the President’s military
authority, and can be distinguished from a statute that is penal in
nature. 157 Accordingly, the court concluded that speculation and
expressed fears are insufficient to establish standing of
enforcement. 158 Here, it appears that the panel’s disagreement
with the district court’s treatment of §1021 as a criminal penalty,
allowed the panel to essentially sidestep the First Amendment
issues.
But on the contrary, the First Amendment claims
warranted greater inquiry than that given by the Second Circuit.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, expressly
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” 159 Although the First Amendment is addressed
to Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to protect
the freedom of speech “covered by the First Amendment.” 160 Few
constitutional rights are so zealously protected as freedom of
expression. 161 Any governmental regulation that restricts the
content of speech, generally receives the highest form of judicial
scrutiny. 162

Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
157 Id. at 200.
158 Id. at 203-04.
159 U.S. CONST. amend I.
160 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
161 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
162 Speech is not only verbal expression. The secondary effects doctrine
allows courts to apply intermediate scrutiny to an ordinance that is contentbased if the ordinance is targeted at suppressing the secondary effects of the
speech and not the speech itself. Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary
Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application and
Potential Mischaracterization and Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L.
REV . 1175, 1175 (2002).
155
156
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A finding that a statute is facially unconstitutional results in
invalidation of the law itself. 163 An ordinance is facially
unconstitutional if: (1) “it is unconstitutional in every conceivable
application” because it is “vague or impermissibly restricts a
protected activity” or (2) “it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of
protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally overbroad.” 164 Next,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law must give sufficient
notice of what conduct is proscribed. 165 The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause has been interpreted as requiring
that a statute neither forbid nor require the doing of an act in
terms so vague that people of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 166
In the First Amendment context, the prohibition of vague statutes
or regulations is also based on the potential chilling effect vague
statutes or regulations have on otherwise permissible speech. “If a
person must guess at what speech or expressive conduct may run
afoul of a regulation or statute, that person may be overly cautious
in his or her words or deeds.” 167 If §1021 is construed as a criminal
penalty, as Judge Forrest had done, it is worth recalling that the
Supreme Court had sometimes “invalidate[d] a criminal statute on
its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid
application.” 168
In light of the First Amendment protections, the NDAA
violates the First Amendment because the statute is
impermissibly vague and overbroad. More specifically, Section
1021(b)(2) offers vague and convoluted terms including:
“belligerent act,” “substantially supported,” “coalition partners,”
“terrorist act,” and “associated forces.” 169 Congress failed to define
or limit these key terms, and thus failed to shape the substantive
parameters of executive detention. In practice, governmental
authorities may use indefinite detention against anyone who
“substantially supports” terror against the United States, since
they have great leeway in defining what constitutes “substantial”
and “support” as well as “terror.”
Looking forward, if a circuit split becomes apparent and the
record develops, perhaps the Supreme Court may grant certiorari
in a future challenge to the NDDA. If that happens, there could be
Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id.
165 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
166 See Conally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
167 Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D. Mass. 2000).
168 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983).
169 See Horowitz, supra note 94, at 2897 (stating “[t]he term ‘substantial
support’ should be removed from any future detention statute because it is
confusing and unnecessary. The government has consistently failed to provide
a definition of ‘substantial’ in court.”).
163
164

2015]

National Insecurity

91

reason to think that the Court might closely scrutinize the
ambiguities presented by the NDAA, just like it did last term in
Johnson v. United States, 170 a decision having significant
implications for due process rights. Justice Scalia, wrote for the
majority, and held that imposing an increased sentence under the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 171 a
recidivist statute, violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process
guarantee. 172
In that prosecution, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
watched Petitioner Samuel Johnson because of his connection to a
white-supremacist group. 173 During this period of surveillance,
Johnson disclosed his plan to commit acts of terrorism using
explosives against targets in Minnesota to undercover agents. 174
Johnson pled guilty for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 175
At sentencing the government requested to enhance Johnson’s
sentence by arguing the ACCA, covered his conduct. 176 The ACCA
provides that a federal firearms offender who has three prior
convictions from “any court” for a “violent felony” such as a
“burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives” must be
sentenced to a mandatory minimum fifteen-year imprisonment. 177
ACCA’s residuary clause states that the definition of “violent
felony” includes “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” 178 It is this residuary clause that
violated the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded, because the
clause leads to unpredictable and arbitrary determination by
judges who were left to: (1) estimate the risk posed by a crime
based on an “ordinary case” of a crime; and to (2) determine how
much risk is necessary for a crime to be considered a violent
felony. 179 To Scalia, the residual clause offers no reliable way to
determine what kind of conduct that an “ordinary case” of crime
involves, and hence judges must speculate about what was the
“potential risk” in question. 180 Add to this, uncertainty about how
much risk is necessary to consider a crime as being a violent
felony. 181
Even though Johnson involved a federal sentencing
enhancement, the Court could apply a similar, and I would assert
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
18 U.S.C. §924(e).
172 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
173 Johnson was also a felon with an extensive criminal record. Id. at 2556.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 2555-56.
178 18 U.S.C. §924(e).
179 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
180 Id.
181 Id.
170
171
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necessary, searching inquiry about the unpredictable and
arbitrary applications of the NDDA. Keeping that in mind, would
the Court perceive judges as having the burden to determine if a
defendant’s conduct constituted a “belligerent act,” or whether he
“substantially supported” a terrorist organization. Will it conclude
that judges must also speculate as to whether a defendant has a
connection to al Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, or other groups and
individuals who could be construed as being a “coalition partner”
or “associated force?”
Putting these hypotheticals aside, the reality is that a law
may not ban more conduct than is necessary to achieve its
legitimate objectives. 182 To find that a statute is overbroad, “there
must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties
not before the Court . . . .” 183 The over breadth doctrine confers
standing on a party who demonstrates that a statute “‘create[s] an
unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas' and that [the party]
has suffered an injury.” 184 Over breadth standing is an exception
to traditional standing and is premised upon preventing the selfcensorship and chilling of expression of individuals not before the
court. 185
The NDAA is also overly broad because given the statute’s
wide reach, anyone person who gives to a charity or expresses
opinions about terrorism in writing or in song may be prosecuted.
As seen throughout the Hedges litigation, government attorneys
were unable to define the terms, yet they insisted on maintaining
the authority to do so in the future. In the end, the Second
Circuit’s conclusions failed to resolve the controversy. If nothing
else, it created more questions.
Under the NDAA, will federal agents begin to conduct
surveillance on individuals who frequent ethnic grocery stores,
karate studios, rent motels with cash, who make extreme religious
statements or statements about ongoing violent acts if these
individuals can be construed as having substantially supported a
“terrorist act” or “belligerent act”? Would the conduct of bloggers
who make anti-U.S. statements or cryptic statements endorsing
violence against the U.S. on their websites fall under the purview
of the NDAA? Could whistleblowers, or reporters receiving
information from governmental whistleblowers, be detained
indefinitely? What about groups such as the Tea Party and Black
Lives Matter? Can these groups’ members be considered terrorists
See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 587-89 (1989).
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
(citations omitted).
184 Young v, Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Nunez
v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 1997).
185 Id.
182
183
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if they engage in unlawful activity? Would these groups then be
considered threats to National Security? Based on reasonable fears
of being indefinitely detained under the NDAA, would Americans
abstain from associating with others for fear of prosecution? Would
bloggers refrain from writing anything than could be construed as
assisting terrorist as defined by the NDDA? Until the NDAA’s
terms are better defined by Congress, Americans remain in the
dark about what conduct exactly is prescribed.
Further, while the NDAA debate may seemingly be neatly
divided along American citizen and non-American citizen lines, it
is not. In fact, those who hold dual citizenship may be especially
vulnerable if the government and the judiciary perceive them as
being less American and being entitled only to a watered down due
process rights. 186 On this issue, Professor Peter Shuck advises that
dual citizens, who have declared themselves an enemy of the state
or are nominally American citizens and have spent most of their
lives aboard, may be afforded only some, but not all due process
rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 187 Schuck refers to
the killing of Anwar Awlaki via a drone attack in Yemen in 2011
as an example of a dual citizen of the U.S. –and in that case
Awlaki– who the U.S. government alleged plotted to kill
Americans– refused to return to U.S., and evaded capture for a
long time. 188 The government concluded that the intentional
targeting and killing of Awlaki was lawful notwithstanding federal
statues outlawing the murder of Americans overseas and that he
was not entitled to due process of law. 189 Other Americans, who
held dual citizenship, were inadvertently killed in drone strikes. 190
Considering that dual citizenship is becoming increasingly
significant as part of globalization, trepidation about having due
process guarantees for only some and important questions about
who is, and who is not a real American will likely continue.
186 Peter H. Schuck, Drone Strikes: Beyond Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
17, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/17/opinions/la-oe-schuck-dronescitizenship-20130217.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See Charlie Savage, Court Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving
Killing of Americans in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013),
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-targetanwar-al-awlaki.html.
190 See Adam Taylor, The U.S. Keeps Killing Americans in Drone Strikes,
Mostly by Accident, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/23/the-u-s-keeps-killing-americans-in-dronestrikes-mostly-by-accident/ (discussing the killing of Anwar Awlaki and
reporting that Kemel Darswish, an American citizen and preacher was killed
in a strike in Yemen in 2002; Samir Khan, an American citizen and al-Qaeda
militant, was killed at the same time as Awaki; Jude Kenan, a Florida born alQaeda and Pakistani Taliban recruiter was killed in Pakistan in 2011; Ahmed
Farouq and Adam Gadahn, both American al-Qaeda militants, were killed in
2015).
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V. LEARNING FROM HISTORY AND AVOIDING ANOTHER
MANIFEST I NJUSTICE
In an authoritative casebook analyzing the internment
cases, a team of legal scholars persuasively argue that another
Korematsu could be avoided by applying close judicial scrutiny
when addressing national security issues during a time of war. 191
As we may have seen in Korematsu and Hamdi, the constitutional
rights of American citizens should always be safeguarded during
times of war, and courts should apply heightened scrutiny and
more rigid analysis in cases involving the delicate balancing of
executive authority and individual civil liberties during national
emergencies. 192
Placing the internment in its appropriate historical, social,
and political context requires an acknowledgement of a long legacy
of discrimination against Asian Americans that has existed on
many fronts, including immigration, 193 business, 194 education, 195
and on social and political levels. 196 Likewise, the NDAA should
also be placed in its historical and sociopolitical context. In doing
so, another mass trampling of civil liberties should be avoided.
As most Americans can recall, Arab and Muslim Americans
were racially and culturally profiled by the federal government
after the September 11th attacks. Eric Muller compares the
internment experience of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese
ancestry after Pearl Harbor to the experiences of alien detainees
or interrogated by the federal government after 9/11. 197 He
See YAMAMOTO 2013, supra note 15, at 412.
See BREYER, supra note 70, at 189-93, 212-14.
193 See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1922) (upholding the
denial of citizenship to Japanese); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 730-31 (1893) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609-11 (1889) (limiting ethnic Chinese from
returning to United States after leaving country); Bessho v. United States, 178
F. 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1910) (upholding immigration act limiting privileges of
naturalization of Japanese); In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas., 223, 224 (C.D. Cal. 1878)
(holding that a Chinese immigrant was not a “white person” and thus was
ineligible for naturalization).
194 See Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 1118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating racially
motivated laundry ordinances).
195 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (holding that the school
district’s failure to provide English language instruction to Chinese-speaking
students created unequal educational opportunities); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275
U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding “separate but equal doctrine” in public schools
against Chinese student born in the United States).
196 See Henry S. Cohn & Harvey Gee, “No, No, No, No!” Three Sons of
Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
1, 23 (2003) (“Resentment towards the Chinese reverberated in the laws that
barred them from meaningful participation in American society.”).
197 See Muller, supra note 72, at 573.
191
192
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suggests that of the approximately five hundred detainees
detained by the Justice Department were held on suspicion of
immigration law violations, criminal charges and unrelated to
terrorism, and some held as “material witnesses” five months after
9/11. 198 To Muller, this was a much smaller group of individuals
compare to twice the number of Japanese aliens placed in federal
custody within three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 199 The
Justice Department sent letters inviting more than five thousand
young aliens of mostly Arab and Muslim countries, to voluntary
interview under the auspices of information gathering purposes
about al Qaeda and other foreign-based terrorist organizations. 200
These men arrived in the U.S. during the two years prior to 9/11,
and held students, tourist, or business visas. 201 Some of men
allegedly had terrorist ties. 202 Mueller asserts, “despite dire
predictions that the supposedly information-gathering interviews
would be mere pretext for coercive criminal interrogations . . . the
program of interrogation, if it was ethnic profiling at all was ethnic
profiling with a decidedly light touch.” 203
However, the intrusiveness of the government’s actions were
much more serious than Mueller describes them to be, on several
levels. To begin, on the issue of the typical investigative
interviews, Mueller may be downplaying the precarious position
that these men were in. For instance, Professor Richard Leo, a
leading interrogation expert, asserts that “[m]odern methods of
psychological interrogation have been designed to persuade
suspects that--contrary to all appearances, logic, and common
sense--it is actually in their self-interest to confess.” 204 Detectives
often employ a ruse and call suspects to “voluntarily” come into
198 See id; see also Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 O HIO ST. J. CRIM .
L. 45, 49-50 (2003) (explaining in the month following 9/11 “the number of
[persons of Middle-Eastern descent] taken into federal custody mushroomed
from dozens, to hundreds, to over one thousand.”); YAMAMOTO 2013, supra
note 15, at 395 (stating “Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government has
detained dozens of individuals under the pretext of using them as material
witnesses. . . . Although they are only permitted to be held for the time
required to testify or be deposed, the government has repeatedly held
individuals as material witnesses, at times for longer than six months,
without deposing them or calling them to testify.”).
199 Muller, supra note 72, at 573.
200 Id. at 574; See also DAVIS , supra note 81, at 117; see Y AMAMOTO 2013,
supra note 15, at 395 (explaining “Most of the people summarily incarcerated
by the Justice Department in the wake of the 9/11 attacks were non-citizen
men of Arab, Middle Eastern or South Asian origin. Immediately after
September 11, 2001, and again in 2004, the FBI and immigration authorities
interviewed 8,000 individuals.”).
201 Muller, supra note 72, at 575.
202 Id. at 576-77.
203 Id.
204 RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 121
(2008).
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the police station for questioning. 205 Investigators will not let on
they believe the suspect committed a crime or their intent to
interrogate him. 206 As Professor Leo explains the procedure:
Detectives intentionally ask the suspect to come to the police
station so that they can isolate the suspect from any familiar
environments, friends, family, or any other source of social support
that might psychologically empower the suspect to resist the
interrogation process. Detectives also wish to get the suspect on
police territory, in an interrogation room, in order to exercise
control over the timing, pace, and strategy of interrogation. 207
From that point forward, detectives apply targeted
psychological techniques designed to create a rapport. 208 Professor
Leo describes common tactics employed by detectives in routine
criminal investigations, including avoiding the requirement of a
Miranda warning by redefining the circumstances of questioning
so that the suspect technically is not in custody through means of
“telling the suspect that he is not under arrest and is free to
leave.” 209 Detectives may also avoid asking the suspect for an
explicit waiver of his rights, and move directly into the
interrogation. 210 Further, they can also minimize the importance
of Miranda warnings and persuade the suspect to waive Miranda
and consent to interrogation. 211 Similarly, interrogators can
portray themselves as friends, as opposed to adversaries. 212
Finally, harsher techniques materialize in flat out accusations,
attacking denial, and utilizing ploys to entice a suspect into
believing that the police possess criminalizing evidence against
him. 213
Professor Christopher Slobogin voices similar concerns,
relaying that U.S. interrogation manuals advocate minimization
(lulling suspects into a false sense of security and offering
sympathy) and maximization (exaggerating seriousness of offense
and bluffing about incriminating evidence) techniques when a
suspect does not initially confess to the crime. 214 All told, if the
government employed similar techniques during their questioning
of detainees in the wake of 9/11, such tactics are certainly more
akin to a heavy hand, rather than decidedly “a light touch.”
Id.
Id.
207 Id. at 122.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 124-25
210 Id. at 125-26.
211 Id. at 126.
211 Id. at 126.
212 Id. at 128.
213 Id. at 134-39.
214
See Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police
Investigative Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L & COM . REG. 321, 338-39 (2011).
205
206

2015]

National Insecurity

97

More generally, Mueller states that unlike the high
concentration of Japanese Americans on the west coast, Arab and
Muslim Americans reside throughout the United States and are
more assimilated to American mainstream culture than Japanese
Americans were during World War II. 215 But sometimes Muslims
are still specially targeted because of their religious beliefs and
perceived foreignness. This was apparent in the failed prosecution
of suspected Guantanamo Bay spy Captain James ‘Youseff’ Yee, a
Chinese American army officer, and Muslim convert. 216
Captain Yee was raised a Christian in New Jersey, graduated
from WestPoint in 1990, and the following year converted to
Islam. 217 In August 1991 he was deployed to Saudi Arabia where
he married a Syrian woman. 218 When he returned to the United
States, he re-enlisted when the Pentagon asked him to serve as a
chaplain for the army. 219 Captain Yee was charged with various
claims, and continued to face a group of miscellaneous charges
lodged against him in what appeared to many to be an effort to
drum him out of the military in disgrace. 220
Initially, [In 2003] the U.S. government alleged that Yee, as part of
an Islamic Fifth Column of extremists, breached security with two
Arab language translators at Guantanamo Bay. The U.S.
government detained Yee for a month before formally charging him
with five offenses: sedition, aiding the enemy, spying, espionage,
and failure to obey a general order. Officials reported that they
found “suspicious documents” and notebooks containing information
and diagrams about detainees in Yee's backpack. However, it was
later determined that these documents were never labeled as
classified, and the diagrams were Yee's anecdotal notes written for
himself concerning counseling sessions with some of the
prisoners. 221

After spending three months in a military prison, the
government quietly, and seemingly reluctantly, dropped the
espionage charges due to lack of proof. Yee was allowed to return
to active duty but only in the capacity of a desk clerk. However, a
month after his release, authorities brought new charges of
adultery and having illegally downloaded pornography [on a

See Muller, supra note 72, at 583.
See Harvey Gee, Asian Americans and Citizen Rights, 8 RUTGERS RACE
& L. REV . 51, 68 (2006) (book review).
217 Mark Miller, A Very Curious Case, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2003, at 41.
218 Id.
219 See Andrew Law, Wen Ho Lee II?, ALTERNET (Sept. 28, 2003),
www.alternet.org/story/16851/wen_ho_lee_ii.
220 See Harvey Gee, From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond: Asian Americans
and Diversity in America, 9 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 129, 138 (2004).
221 Id. at 138-39.
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government-issued computer]. Some believe that these new
allegations are wrought with vindictiveness and bitterness. 222
The Yee case is a likely example of racial profiling against
Muslim Americans. Captain Yee is an American-born son of
Chinese immigrants, raised in a New Jersey suburb, and just so
happened to convert to Islam. 223 During its prosecution of Yee, the
government portrayed him as both Chinese and Muslim, with
possible ties to terrorists. 224
Finally, Mueller described an alien detention process that
may have been over-and under-inclusive, and impractical because
as Professor Frank Wu explains, the racial profiling of Arab
Americans and Muslim Americans relies on an incorrect belief
that
a large number or all the terrorists are Arab or Muslim. . . . Most
Arab Americans are not Muslim; most Muslims in the United States
are South Asian or African Americans; and the post-September 11
backlash of violence has revealed our collective carelessness in
assaulting Indian Sikhs—neither Arab nor Muslim but persons who
look like they might be Arab or Muslim because of skin color,
accents, and dress. 225

Similarly, Professor Sharon Davies rejects the suggestion that
Arab or Middle Eastern ancestry provides an appropriate basis for
suspicion of terrorism activities, 226 and cites to the examples of
Timothy McVeigh, a white male who detonated a bomb outside the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that claimed
68 lives and injured over 500 in 1985; and Ted Kaczynski, the
“Unabomber,” another white male, who was responsible for
bombings spanning over seventeen years. 227 Just as how racism
motivated the Japanese Americans internment which based on the
inaccurate claim that Japanese Americans as a group were
disloyal, the targeting of Arabs and Muslims was based on false
perceptions that they would be more likely to be terrorists. 228

Id. at 139.
Id.
224 Id.; see also Gee, supra note 216, at 68-69.
225 Wu, supra note 68, at 58; see also See Y AMAMOTO 2013, supra note 15,
at 392 (“Preconceived biases and newly conceived stereotypes appear to have
infected public thinking and government policymaking post-9/11.”).
226 See Davies, supra note 198, at 52.
227 Id. at 78-79.
228 See Jerry Kang, Thinking Through the Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9
ASIAN L.J. 195, 197 (2002) (asserting an important lesson of the internment “is
that wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of
mistakes.”); Mark S. Kende, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Korematsu Problem, 30
HARV . J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 293, 295 (2014) (stating “[t]he only difference
between these West Coast Americans from Americans with German or Italian
backgrounds, was their Asian race. The United States also had a history of
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the NDAA’s current language, the definitions can be
contracted or expanded when necessary. Contrary to many
assurances, the government can use the NDAA to indefinitely
detain any individual or groups that it claims to be involved in, or
are connected to terrorist activities against the United States.
Hopefully, in time, the impact and breadth of the NDAA will
become more clear, as future administrations interpret the Act,
and as the social and political climate changes. 229 Even though
President Obama has stated that he will not indefinitely detain
American citizens, a future President might decide otherwise.
Further, as shown in this Article, more and better Congressional
guidance is also needed to establish guidelines on the President’s
authority to detain American citizens. Until that happens, the
question of whom the U.S. military can hold and for how long
continues to be left for courts to decide, or not decide.

discriminating against Asians, and the military orders reflected these
stereotypes given their over and under-inclusiveness.”).
229 See Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear
Statement Rule and the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United
States, 101 G EO. L.J. 1399, 1421 (2013) (asserting that “existing law or
authorities” is both ambiguous and troubling).
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